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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No, 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals from the affirmance of a conviction of issuing 
bad checks, a third degree felony, after a jury trial in the 
Second Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the petition under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 
1989) and 78-2a-4 (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
1. Whether this Court should deny review based upon 
defendant's failure to raise proper grounds for review? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only when there are 
special and important reasons therefor. The 
following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issues of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a 
decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of this 
court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important questions of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has 
not been, but should be, settled by this 
court, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas R. Humphries, was charged with 
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (Supp. 1988) (R. 13-14). Defendant was 
convicted as charged after a jury trial held November 4, 1988, in 
the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding (R. 
57). Defendant was sentenced by Judge Cornaby to a term of not 
more than five years in the Utah State Prison, fined $5,000, and 
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,826.15. Id. On 
appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction 
on November 15, 1989, in an unpublished Memorandum Decision. (See 
Appendix "A"; Memorandum Decision). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 5, 1988, defendant opened a checking account at 
the Washington Drive-up Branch of First Security Bank in Ogden, 
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Utah. Defendant deposited $100.00 into the new checking 
account, the only deposit ever made by defendant (R. 79-81). 
Subsequently, defendant issued the following checks which were 
not honored by the bank: 
DATE WRITTEN PAYEE AMOUNT 
May 26, 1988 Bowman's Market $ 90.00 
May 27, 1988 Bowman's Market $ 90.00 
May 30, 1988 K-Mart $273.36 
May 30, 1988 Bowman's Market $ 70.00 
June 5, 1988 Ernst $ 93.19 
June 5, 1988 Ernst $ 70.93 
Additionally, numerous other checks totalling $1,221.62 were 
issued and returned for insufficient funds. At the time of 
trial, defendant had not attempted to pay for the dishonored 
checks. 
At trial, defendant testified that he did not knowingly 
issue the bad checks. He explained that some-cime between May 5 
and 15, 1988, he had given a friend, Dorie Stewart, the sum of 
$3,600 in cash along with a deposit slip to be deposited in his 
checking account. He claimed the unbeknownst to him, Stewart did 
not deposit the cash but applied it to a debt owing to her by 
defendant. 
Defendant claimed that the $3,600 in cash was a 
settlement from a fire insurance claim which was split between he 
and two business partners. However, he offered no evidence to 
corroborate his testimony that he had received a $3,600 insurance 
settlement. Finally, he stated that he did not report to the 
The facts are supported by the Memorandum Decision attached as 
Appendix "A". 
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police that Stewart had taken the $3,600 because he owed her some 
money. 
On appeal from his conviction, defendant was appointed 
Steven C. Vanderlinden as new counsel on appeal. Mr, 
Vanderlinden filed the Brief of Appellant in the Utah Court of 
Appeals on May 5, 1989. (See Appendix "B"; Brief). On June 26, 
1989, defendant filed a pro se Motion to Appoint New Counsel on 
Pendency of Appeal. (See Appendix "C"; Motion). On July 20, 
1989, the Court of Appeals issued an order denying defendant's 
motion on the basis that counsel had timely responded to the 
c~urt with respect to the appeal and that defendant had not shown 
a substantial conflict of interest with his counsel (See Appendix 
"D"; Order). Defendant now seeks review of the Court of Appeals' 
Memorandum Decision affirming his conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Review by writ of certiorari should not be granted 
where defendant's sole claim is ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. This issue was not properly presented to the 
Court of Appeals and was not considered in the court's opinion. 
The remedy of post-conviction relief is available for defendant 
to properly seek review of his claim. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT REVIEW WHERE 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ALLEGE PROPER GROUNDS FOR 
REVIEW. 
In his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, petitioner 
argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. As the basis for his claim, petitioner argues that 
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appellate counsel was reluctant to accept the appointment as 
counsel and refused to argue certain issues on appeal which were 
requested by petitioner. Petitioner's request for review should 
be denied, 
A review by a "writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion . . .M Rule 43, Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. While not exhaustive, the following 
considerations represent the character of reasons for granting 
review: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the court of 
Appeals on the same issues of law: 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a 
decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of this court's 
power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided 
an important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should 
be, settled by the court. 
Id. 
In the present case, petitioner requests this Court to 
review appellate counsel's effectiveness before the Court of 
Appeals. However, this issue was not properly raised in the 
Court of Appeals and was not considered in the court's memorandum 
decision. (See Appendices MCM and "D"). This Court would be at a 
disadvantage in attempting to review a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel on a writ of certiorari where 
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there has been no exploration and determination of the underlying 
facts of the claim. The well-reasoned appellate requirement that 
an issue be first squarely presented in the lower court is 
applicable in the present case. See State v. Stegell, 660 P.2d 
252 (Utah 1982) . 
It must be noted that petitioner is not without a 
remedy. Petitioner's claim could be properly presented in a 
post-conviction action under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i). Petitioner 
would then have an opportunity to present evidence in support of 
his ineffectiveness claim and make a record which could be 
properly reviewed by an appellate court if necessary. See 
Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Utah Nov. 16, 
1989) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied. 
DATED this l -' day of February, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. iABTSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Thomas R. Humphries, pro se, 1141 
South 2250 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84014, this /_^_~&5y of 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880104-CA 
v. : 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Apellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Sec. 78-29-3 (f) Utah Code 
Annotated. The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of Issuing a 
Bad Check or Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated, a Felony of 
the Third Degree in the Second Judicial District Court, in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah, November 4, 1988. Defendant was 
sentenced December 6, 1988 and an appeal was filed December 22, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1- Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the 
prosecution to state to the jury in his closing argument that in 
his opinion the Defendant was a dishonest man, and in the opinion 
of a witness who didn't testify that he was a dishonest man. 
2- Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow the 
prosecution to threaten a witness if she testified. 
3- Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the state to 
question the Defendant as to why he didn't subpoena a certain 
witness. 
4- Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow bank 
records into evidence that were not part of the charges against 
the Defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions will be 
excerpted as they become relevant in the argument, and provided 
in full in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary hearing was held in the Fourth Circuit Court, 
Layton Department, on September 8, 1988. The Defendant was bound 
over for Trial. A jury trial was held on November 4, 1988, and 
the Defendant was found guilty of issuing a bad check or draft in 
violation of Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated. The Defendant 
was sentenced to prison on December 6, 1988. An appeal was filed 
on December 22, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 1, 1988, Tom Humphries opened a checking 
account with First Security Bank.(T.173). He gave Dorie Stewart, 
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a good friend, S3 , 600.00. (T.175). He asked Dorie Stewart to 
deposit the money in his checking account because he was working 
10-14 hours a day.(T.174). He received the money from G.A.B. 
Adjusters who represented the Fireman's Fund Insurance.(T.175) . 
Thereafter Mr. Humphries wrote numerous checks on that account. 
(T.176, T.177). Mr. Humphries, on June 6, 1988, went to 
Portland, Oregon to handle some business on June 6, 1988.(T.179) 
and came back the middle of August.(T.179). Upon his return he 
learned that Dorie Stewart had used the money and not deposited 
it in his checking account. 
(T.178). Later Mr. Humphries was arrested, a preliminary hearing 
held and then the matter was set for Jury Trial. During the 
Trial, Mr. Humphries called Dorie Stewart to the stand.(T.166) . 
Before Defense counsel could begin testimony, the State 
requested the opportunity to Voir Dire Dorie Stewart. (T.168) . 
The State threatened Dorie Stewart with prosecution for 
theft.(T.169). Then the State advised her that she wouldn't 
have to testify.(T.169) and that if she did testify, those 
things could be used against her.(T.169). Dorie Stewart 
subsequently refused to testify and took the Fifth Amendment. 
(T.171). In closing argument, the State told the jury that 
Dorie Stewart, •'didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to 
tell the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest". 
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(T.217). The prosecutor then went on to give his personal 
opinion, "That the defendant is a dishonest person"(T.212) and 
to •'disregard the testimony of the defendant because of his 
dishonesty"(T.227). After the prosecutor gave his opinion 
of what Dorie Stewart would state under oath, even though he 
successfully intimidated her so she didn't testify, the jury 
found Mr, Humphries guilty as charged. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial of Defendant was fraught with error. It is a well 
established legal principal supported by hundreds of Decisions 
that a Trial must be conducted in such a way that no prejudice or 
unfair advantage attaches to either the State or the Defendant. 
The fact that the prosecutor steps forward and gives his opinion 
to the jury that the Defendant is a dishonest man, is enough to 
substantiate prejudice, couple the prosecutor giving his own 
opinion and then giving the opinion of a witness who he prevented 
from testifying and clearly the Defendant was prejudiced beyond 
harmless error. 
Further, the State went beyond the bonds of fair play when 
they clearly intimidated a Defendant's witness into not 
testifying. The State has substantial power that they must use 
carefully, and comments to a witness by the State about filing 
theft charges against her were inappropriate. The Judge should 
have done the questioning and Dorie Stewart should of had the 
.4. 
advice of an attorney. What was the purpose of advising her of 
theft charges, when the "alleged" victim was the Defendant and 
he had never expressed a desire to prosecute for the "alleged" 
theft. The prosecution simply intimidated the witness. 
Finally, the verdict should be overturned because the State 
implied the Defendant had a burden of proof in the case, offered 
in evidence. Of other returned checks that Mr. Humphrey had 
written and gave Mr. Humphries an attorney at preliminary hearing 
who had a conflict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTION 
TO STATE TO THE JURY IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT IN HIS 
OPINION THE DEFENDANT WAS A DISHONEST MAN. 
It is a well established rule of law that it is improper for 
a lawyer to assert in closing argument his personal belief or 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused,(88 ALR 3d 463). The 
present case falls under that well established law. The 
prosecutor stated on more than one occasion in his closing 
argument that the Defendant was dishonest. Based on those 
statements the guilty verdict against Thomas R. Humphries should 
be overturned. 
Many states besides Utah support the proposition that 
personal belief or opinion by a prosecutor is improper. The 
opinion or belief has been held improper and the verdict 
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overturned when prosecutors express their opinion or belief in 
many different ways. In Commonwealth v. Gilmore 245 Pa Super 27, 
369 A2d 276 (1976). The court overturned the verdict because the 
prosecutor said Hthat Commonwealth had given jurors "the truth". 
In Artis v Commonwealth 213 VS 220, 191 SE2d 190(1972) the 
decision was overturned because the prosecutor stated that he 
could never bring to Court a case which was more convincing. See 
also People vs. Rosado 43 App. Div. 2d 916, 352 NYS2d 11,(9174), 
wherein the following statement by the prosecutor was deemed 
improper. WI think I am almost making a fool of myself making a 
summation in the case because the case is open and shut.M Another 
case specifically in point is Commonwealth v. Valle 240 Pa. 
Super 411, 362 A2d 1021(1976). In that case the prosecutor 
said: 
"I say to you, if by pleading not guilty that vicious 
guy over there, Martin Valle, says: I didn't do these 
things, then I say to you Martin Valle is a liar"(emphasis 
added). 
There are numerous Western State decisions which hold the 
same proposition. A 1982 Wyoming case reiterated the law when 
they held: 
"It is improper for prosecutors to either vouch for 
their own credibility or to testify as to their own 
personal belief or opinion of matter in controversy." 
Banners v. State 642 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1982). See also 
People v. Loscutoff 661 P.2d 274 (Col. 1983). 
Utah law adopted much the same posture, only preferring to 
use a two prong test, the case law seems to have started in 
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State v. Valdez 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) and has since 
been referred to and used as the standard on several different 
occasions. The most recent reference by the Utah Supreme Court 
seems to be State v. Laffertv 749 P.2d 1239(Utah 1988). 
More specifically the two-part test as outlined in all the 
above cases is stated in State vs. Slowe as follows: 
"Slowe also contends that the prosecutor's 
use of the word fence ,during closing arguments 
amounted to a reversible error. We disagree. 
A prosecutor's comments warrant reversible only 
if (1) the comments call the jury's attention to 
matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and (2) the jurors were probably influenced by 
the remarks." State vs. Slowe 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985) 
Thus, in order to overturn the present case on Defendant-
Appellant, the Court must determine whether the opinions given by 
the prosecutor were: (1) comments which called the jury's 
attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and (2) whether those comments probably influenced the 
jury. 
Both parts of the test are clearly met in the present 
case. The prosecutor was content to state his opinion only once 
in closing argument on Mr. Humphries case. During his 15 minutes 
of closing argument and rebuttal he stated the following: 
"When we began our case in the morning, hours 
of this day, we never told you that the Defendant 
was going to be honest, that he was going to tell 
the truth, or that he had ever told the truth in 
any day of his life" (emphasis added) (T.211) 
••The Defendant is a dishonest person" (T.212) 
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"The only doubt that has been provided hereto 
you today has been possible, fanciful or imaginary. 
Do not dignify it with any more than that in your 
deliberations" (T.217) 
"That is what I ask you to do here today and 
that is to disregard the testimony of the Defendant 
because of his dishonesty.- (T.227) 
T v e tried to sell you today that the Defendant 
is dishonest". (T.228) 
"That's the statement of a dishonest man and 
the conclusion that you must draw is that the doubt 
before you is not a reasonable one." (T.230) 
Any one of the above opinions of the prosecutor are 
detrimental and damaging to the Defendant, and each on its own 
calls the jury's attention to the prosecutor's opinion that the 
Defendant is dishonest. The prosecutor has absolutely no right 
to give his opinion to the jury because the jury cannot use or 
judge a person's guilt or innocence by that criteria. In this 
case, the prosecutor on several occasions gave his opinion, thus 
satisfying the first test enumerated in State vs. Valdez 
(supra.) Comments were made (prosecutor's opinion) which called 
the jury's attention to matters the jury should not consider. 
The second part of the test, ie, whether or not the comments 
probably influenced the jury. The Defendant Appellant 
respectfully points out that there is no question but what the 
limited burden of probably influencing the jury has been met. 
Because the statements were multiple and because they were made 
by the prosecutor they did influence the jury. The case has the 
prosecutor, the very person by his office, who the jury would 
look to for honesty and integrity, the person who represents the 
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State, ie, the people, and therefore someone who's opinion should 
not be regarded lightly. He stands for law and order, and 
enforcement of our laws, principals we all believe in and hope 
are accomplished. When he states something to the jury, it must 
be done with the up most concern for his office and position. 
His comments, his opinions are by the nature of his office, held 
in high esteem by the jury. 
One statement by the prosecutor to the jury giving his 
opinion that the Defendant is dishonest meet the burden of 
probably influencing them. The prosecutor in this case, however, 
was not content to tell the jury his opinion once. On no less 
than six different occasions, the prosecutor alluded to or 
stated that in his opinion the Defendant was dishonest. As 
stated in State vs. Abu-Isba 685 P.2d 235 (Kan. 1985): 
"Error is committed when prosecutor injects 
his or her personnel opinion into closing arguments." 
There is no question but what the prosecutor made a 
mistake. A mistake that has influenced a jury to find a man 
guilty. The only way to rectify the problem is to rule the 
numerous comments were reversible error. 
The second part of the first point that the Defendant-
Appellant wants to raise with the Court is very similar to the 
prosecutor giving his own opinion. The only difference is that 
not only did the prosecutor give his own opinion about the case, 
but he went on to give the opinion as to what a witness would 
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testify about, when in fact he prevented that witness from 
testifying. Thus, the prosecution in his closing argument gave 
his opinion as to what Dorie Stewart would have stated if she 
would have testified. 
The closing argument of the prosecutor is filed with 
numerous references to the prosecutors opinion of the Defendant's 
dishonesty. Unfortunately, the prosecutor didn't stop with his 
own opinion, he compounded his errors by giving the opinion of a 
witness who was forced to take the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Dorie Stewart was subpoenaed by the Defendant and was called to 
the stand. After some brief foundational questions, the 
prosecutor asked permission to Voir Dire, wherein the following 
exchange took place: 
Q. Do you understand that if you took money without permission 
from someone, even though that person may have owed you money, 
that could be considered theft? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered you 
any immunity and you could therefore..the things that you say 
here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. (T.169) 
After the above exchange took place, the witness Dorie 
Stewart chose to exercise her Fifth Amendment privilege and not 
to testify(T.170). Despite Dorie Stewart not testifying, the 
prosecutor stated in his closing argument: 
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"We had a witness who took the stand who said 
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the Fifth 
Amendment. What does that mean to you? Don't get 
caught in the trap to think that's an admission on 
her part. I submit to you that she didn't want to 
hurt her friends here, that her friend had asked 
her to come and testify, gave her a subpoena which 
she couldn't disobey. She had to sit on the stand. 
She wanted to tell the truth, but then she didn't 
want to have to tell the truth. She didn't want to 
lie, but she also didn't want to tell the hard truth 
and that is that this roan is dishonest. She took the 
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." (emphasis 
added) (T.216, 217) 
POINT II 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW THE PROSECUTION 
TO THREATEN A WITNESS IF SHE TESTIFIED 
The Defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to 
have the witnesses on his behalf to testify. The intimidating 
nature of the prosecutor's questioning and his reference to 
possible theft charges, caused the witness to refuse to testify, 
and thereby violating one of the Defendant's basic rights. 
The legislature of the State of Utah has seen fit to enact 
basic rights of a person accused of a crime. Sec. 77-1-6, Utah 
Code Ann. states in part: 
"(1) In criminal prosecutions, the Defendant is 
entitled 
(e) to have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf." 
The Constitution of Utah, Article I Sec. 9 states: 
"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
have the right....to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf." 
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The Defense cognizant of his constitutional and statutory 
rights subpoenaed Dorie Stewart. Dorie Stewart had been a friend 
of the Defendant since January of 1988 (T.174). The alleged 
issuing of bad checks took place in May, 1988 (T.176) and the 
Witness Dorie Stewart was testifying on November 4, 1988(T.i). 
Dorie, according to Defense Counsel's opening remarks was suppose 
to testify that she was to deposit the money in Tom's account. 
(T.158) Before any testimony could be elicited the prosecutor 
requested and was granted the right to Voir Dive. The following 
took place: 
Q. Do you understand that you have a right against having to 
say anything in court that would indicate that you've done 
anything that's criminal? Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm having to anticipate somewhat some of the things that 
you might be asked to testify about just based upon the 
conversations that I've had from counsel. 
Do you understand that if you took money without 
permission from someone even though that person may have owed you 
that money, that could be considered theft? (Emphasis added) 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered 
you any immunity and you could, therefore — the things that you 
say here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, also what the word "perjury* means? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court what you understand 
perjury to mean. 
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A. If I get up here and I don't tell the truth lying to the 
Court. 
Q. You understand there would be a criminal penalty if you 
were to say anything other than the truth? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Understanding those things, you understand that if you 
desire not to testify, you can tell counsel or the Court that you 
don't want to answers questions? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Even though, and that you still want to answer questions 
today? 
A. Yeah. 
THE COURT: Is that a yes or no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that all of your Vcir Dire? 
MR. NAMBA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ask the jurors to come back in. 
The prosecutor had no right to threaten the witness with 
theft. The threat is even more chilling when you realize that it 
comes from a person representing the State. Someone who can 
indeed file criminal charges against you. Someone who wants to 
convict the witness friend of a crime, the Judge,.an impartial 
man was present, he is present to see that a fair trial takes 
place. He is the person to ask a person about Fifth Amendment 
privileges. Based on the inappropriate questions by the 
prosecutor, Dorie Stewart refused to testify and the Defendant 
was deprived of a constitutional right. 
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POINT III 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE STATE TO QUESTION 
THE DEFENDANT AS TO WHY HE DID NOT SUBPOENA A CERTAIN WITNESS 
A Defendant has a right to a free and impartial trial, he 
has no burden of proof whatsoever. He can testify or not 
testify, he can call ten witnesses or none. The State has the 
burden, they must present evidence. They must prove the evidence 
against the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
prosecutor's questioning of the Defendant clearly infringed on 
Defendant's privileges and rights, the Defendant chose to take 
the stand and testify, on cross-examination the prosecutor asked 
the Defendant the following: 
Q. Steve is a friend of yours? 
A. A business relationship. 
Q. You didn't ask him to come and testify? 
(T.182) 
Then the prosecutor elicits statements from the Defendant 
about what Dorie Stewart had told him. (Despite the fact that he 
had successfully suppressed her testimony). 
Q. During the period from the 15th of May to the 6th of 
June, when you moved out, did you have daily contact with Dorie? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. She never told you that she deposited the money. 
A. She told me that she deposited the money. 
Q. Then she finally told you over the telephone sometime 
later? 
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A. No, she didn't. She told me that Donna Shaffer had said 
that a police officer had come by asking some questions and 
trying to determine why they would come back to ask me questions 
is when I realized that something had happened with the checking 
account, (T.188) 
Later, the prosecutor asks more questions about what Dorie 
Stewart said. 
Q. What did Dorie tell you over the phone? 
A. Dorie told me that Donna Shaffer said that somebody came 
by with a suit on asking questions. 
Q. Dorie did not know of her knowledge what had happened? 
A. I guess Dorie heard from Donna Shaffer that Detective 
Barton had been by. (T.195) 
In closing argument, the prosecutor said the following: 
•'Don't you think you could come up with some 
proof that you held an insurance claim with 
someone when you have three partners to split 
the money, two other partners to split the money 
with, one of them that would come and testify 
that we split the money with him or the insurance 
company? Even a letter from the insurance company 
certifying that they had given him a settlement 
on this.*' 
HWe had a witness who took the stand who said 
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the 
Fifth Amendment. What does that mean to you? 
Don't get caught in the trap to think that's 
an admission on her part . . . she took the 
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." 
(T.215) 
The Nevada Supreme Court had a situation similar to ours and 
ruled as follows: 
••Prosecutors comment in closing argument in 
prosecution for forgery, suggesting that it 
was defendants*s burden to produce proof by 
explaining absence of witnesses or "come up 
with something" was clearly inaccurate and 
improper" Emerson vs State 643 P. 2d 1212 (Nev. 1982) 
-15-
Other Jurisdictions have also ruled the same way. 
"Comments of prosecutor during closing argument 
regarding defendant's failure to present evidence 
in support of his defense which comments did not 
pertain to punishment were prejudicial and intentional 
making a new trial necessary. Watt v. City of Oklahoma 
628 P.2d 371(Okl. 1981)• See also State v. Froats 
615 P.2d 1078 (Or. 1980) where the Court held it was error 
to comment in jury argument on the failure of a witness 
to testify who has validly invoked that privilege (Fifth 
Amendment privilege). 
The prosecutor violated not only the privilege against self 
incrimination but Defendant's right to due process, ie, the right 
of innocent until proven guilty. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW BANK RECORDS 
INTO EVIDENCE THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT 
The Defendant was prejudiced when his checking account 
records, which showed other checks that had not been honored by 
the bank, were given to the jury as evidence even though no 
criminal charges had been filed on the additional checks. The 
checks tainted the jury's view of the Defendant. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 states: 
••Although relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." 
At trial, Defense counsel objected to admission of all 
checks and records other than those being prosecuted. (T.79) 
The prosecution than proceeded to offer several checks into 
evidence that were not honored by the bank. (T.83, 90, 91, 92, 
93, and 94). There was no purpose in discussing those checks. 
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They were not part of the State's case as provided in the 
information. The only purpose of presenting the checks was to 
prejudice the jury. 
The Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury hear 
his case. The jury heard evidence of other checks to other 
stores which prejudiced the jury made it hard not to be biased. 
Improper evidence which prejudices the jury is grounds for 
reversible error and the Defendant states the the prejudice in 
this case would be sufficient for a new trial. 
POINT V 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL 
TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT WHEN HE ADMITTED HE HAD A CONFLICT. 
The Defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel. 
Counsel that is free from bias or prejudice. The counsel that 
represented Mr. Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing was the 
prosecutor for Kaysville city and admitted on the record he had a 
conflict of interest. Mr. Humphries did not receive the benefit 
of fair and impartial counsel at the Preliminary Hearing and the 
guilty verdict should be overturned. 
There does not seem to be any question that the attorney who 
represented the Defendant at the Preliminary Hearing had a 
conflict. At the start of the Preliminary Hearing, it was 
established that the arresting officer was a Kaysville officer 
(Preliminary Hearing T.3). That the Defense attorney was 
employed by Kaysville City (Preliminary Hearing T.3). Then 
Defense counsel on the record stated: 
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" At that point in time, I indicated that 
if he wanted to proceed with trial I didn't 
feel like it was appropriate for me to proceed 
with trial since it involved a Kaysville city 
officer. He agreed, and that's where we stand 
now...." (emphasis added) (Preliminary Hearing T.4) 
However, Mr. Humphries had a choice of additional time in 
jail or waiving a conflict of interest. A choice a person really 
should not have to make, simply because if a person wants an 
attorney, free of prejudice, it does not mean he should wait in 
jail longer. Counsel of prejudice and bias represented Mr. 
Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing the the jury decision should 
be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not received a fair and impartial Trial. 
The Trial was fought with errors. Errors that caused prejudice 
to the Jury. Because the sum total of these errors was 
substantial prejudices, the Jury decision should be reversed. 
DATED this _1_ day of May, 1989. 
'EVEN C. VANDEl(LIN< 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THE COURT: We will return to the H u m p h r i e s ' 
c a s e , Siate vs. H u m p h r i e s , 3 8 1 U 0 0 6 6 9 . Mr. Humphries is 
present under custody, Mr. C e l l a , his c o u n s e l , is p r e s e n t . 
Mr. Nam Da is present for the State of Utah. This "is the time 
set for preliminary e x a m i n a t i o n . 
Mr. H u m p h r i e s , the Court has been advised 
through counsel that you prefer to nave another l a w y e r , anc 
we don't appoint different d e f e n s e l a w y e r s . You can repre-
sent y o u r s e l f if you would like, or you can have Mr. Cella 
r e p r e s e n t you here this a f t e r n o o n . Do you have a p r e f e r e n c e 
about that, sir? 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : W e l l , Your H o n o r , tnere is 
a d e f i n i t e conflict with a t t o r n e y Cella and m y s e l f . 
THE COURT: Would you identify the conflict 
for us? 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your H o n o r , attorney Cella 
has told me that ne has p r o s e c u t e d two cases for d e t e c t i v e 
B a r t o n and also he is also e m p l o y e d by the City of Layton 
in the capacity of city a t t o r n e y . 
M.<. CELLA: T h a t ' s not exactly c o r r e c t , 
J u d g e , City of K a y s v i l l e . The i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r is 
d e t e c t i v e Barton with K a y s v i l l e l i t y . 
I, h o w e v e r , had I known ahead of time that 
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you - - he is in custody ana you have your lu-day p r o b 1 - r,i, 
which Steve just got stuffea by Judge C o r n a b y . 
liK. CELLA: w e l l , fir. H u m p h r i e s has inoicated 
a uesire to proceea unaer what he calls it, a protest, and 
has asked that I represent hin at the P r e l i m i n a r y Hearing 
and do it under protest. I don't --
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Let ne hear from your l a w y e r , 
Mr. H u m p h r i e s , ana then I will give you a chance to s p e a k . 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : W e l l , he is saying what I 
said and that is not what I said, Your H o n o r . 
THE C O U R T : All right, you can tell ne that 
that's not what you said when he finishes talking, so please 
allow him to finish. Go ahead, ilr. C e l l a . 
MR. CELLA: We are prepared to go forward 
today, Your H o n o r . We have no o b j e c t i o n to a c o n t i n u a n c e if 
that is what is d e s i r e d . The D e f e n d a n t o u g h t , i think, to 
make the election if he wants to have a P r e l i m i n a r y H e a r i n g 
at a later d a t e . He is not going to ue released. If he 
wants to w a i v e the time p e r i o d , we have no o b j e c t i o n to 
coming back at a later t i m e . 
THE C O U R T : Mr. H u m p h r i e s , we won't go ahead 
with the P r e l i m i n a r y Hearing today, as you say, under protest 
As counsel s u g g e s t e d , you are going to have to make an 
e l e c t i o n . Ei ther you --
to go ahead ana near these witnesses and -- but I guess 
if there is any infirmity in c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , if there 
is any c o n f l i c t , then a conflict exists in the cross-examina-
tion that might be available for another time. 
MR. NAIiuA: I am concerned that an unrepre-
sented Defendant who would do cross-examination might make 
an error that would not be r e p a r a b l e . 
THE C O U R T : W e l l , I would like the record 
to show thai the Defendant is playing games. He told the 
bailiff on the way here to court that he woula be back here 
tnree or four times because he would have a coniinuance and 
then he went on to further expound that --
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your Honor, may I --
THE C O U R T : N o , you may not interrupt me, 
Mr. H u m p h r i e s . I will hear from you in a moment. He went 
on to expound that he would have a continuance because he 
knew a way to get one and it seems to the Court that he has 
known about the conflict and was aware of, 1 guess, that 
there was some infirmity and just kepi quiet about it, and 
so I would like the record to show that. 
N o w , fir. H u m p h r i e s , is there something that 
you would like to tell the Court? 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your Honor, I wasn't really 
aware of it until attorney Cella interviewed ne just a few 
m o m e n t s ago and told me that he haa actually prosecuted cases 
7 
1 MR. CELLA: How would the Court feel, I can 
2 . have -- fir. V a n d e r l i n d e n can't appear toaay. I can have 
3 I someo n e from his office here tomorrow a f t e r n o o n . I called 
I i 
4 j M r . C a t h c a r t , I can't get him here today. He can appear 
5 j also t o m o r r o w a f t e r n o o n . 
I 
6 ! I ' v e t a l k e d w i t h Mr. Humphr ies , h e ' s - - he 
10 
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would like to go ahead and proceed with the Pr e l i m i n a r y 
H e a r i n g . I have indicated to him that I could go ahead and 
handle today. H o w e v e r , it would require a waiver from him 
on the record of the conflict and I would only serve as 
counsel for the P r e l i m i n a r y Hearing only. I w o u l d n ' t 
r e p r e s e n t him, assuming he was bound o v e r , I wo u l d n ' t 
r e p r e s e n t him any f u r t h e r . He would have another public 
d e f e n d e r or I could obtain private counsel for him. 
THE C O U R T : All right — 
(£na of tape 5 3 9 4 . ) 
MR. C t L L A : Dut he woulci like to go ahead 
and proceed today so he can find out what is going to happen 
19 I so that he doesn ' t have to sit in jail waiting until we can 
20 ! get a n o t h e r d a t e . How, is that --
2i j THt C O U R T : T h a t ' s a g r e e a b l e . 
22 ' rtR. CtLLA : I per c e i v e that as being okay 
23 ! to cover my b a s e s . 
24 
25 
TH£ C O U R T : I think it is. I coinnenc! you and 
Mr. H u n p h r i e s for talking it through and working it out. 
APPENDIX C 
THCI-'JS 11. HUMPHRIES 
IK PROFIA PERSONA 
I . C . BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
FILED 
JUN 26 1989 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
VS. 
THOKAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. 
3ASE NO. 880704-3A 
MOTION TO APPOINT NEv 
;AL 
iv _ • ; OF THE XUET; 
LO1'- the ; i;r;ell'-i:t Tho~se i. Humphries ; 
tendency of appeal. In support cf the 
(1) Counsel has failed to raise before the ']ourt meritorious!; 
arguable issues as requested by the .Appellant. 
(2) Counsel has failed to provide the Appellant with copies 
of briefs filed before this Court, so that the Appellant may 
raise addittional issues in the form of a supplemental brief. 
',3) Counsel has stated on repeated occasions his conflict of 
.nterest in representing Appellant in the case at bar. These 
statements supported by the trial court record were made to 
;he Appellant, other members of the bar and the trial court. 
(motion contfd) 
(4) Counsel has failed to correspond with the Appellant and. 
has in fact refused any correspondance. 
For the above related reasons and the fact that the .Appellant 
no longer has any faith in counsels ability to effectively 
represent his issues in the case at bar, Appellant would 
respectfully request that this Court appoint nev; counsel in 
the interest of justice. 
Respectfully, submitted 
ir P:{cn<\ PHRSC.-I:.; 
; e:: t n i s ~>J
 J=v uav c: ^ r \ Q 198-3 
I hereby certify under oath that I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing motion upon the following named individual 
by deposit with the U.S. Mail. 
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ire &- 5 ?-31 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES 
P.O. BOX 250 
L.iAFER, UTAH 84020 
III PROP IA PERSONA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
APPELLANT, 
VS. 
3T/TZ CF UTAH, 
Zor.es now the ^r.pellsnt ar.d argues two (2) separate but 
r 11 ?-1 ? d issues a s f o 11 o w s : 
{/• ) "vOos -- c o n f l i c t cf i r i t e r o r o e x l r t be tween ^p-pointed c o u n s e l 
----- ->,c '. -.-] rll^nt? 
(2) Has appointed counsel provided Appellant with ineffective 
assistance of counsel? 
The A.ppellant was convicted in a trial by jury in the 
Second District Court, Davis County. At the time set for 
sentencing, December 6th 19S9, the Appellant filed with the 
trial court a notice of appeal and a motion for certificate 
of probable cause. The Court set the hearing for the 20th day 
of December, 1988 and appointed Attorney Steve Vanderlinden 
of the Davis County Public Defenders Office to represent him 
on appeal. At the sentencing hearing the trial court held 
a convers^t.T rm ur-i+v% 
FILED 
JUL 10 1989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 880704-CA 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO APPOINT NE"«' 
X-NSEI 
(memorandum cont!d) 
The Court: 
Okay, V.Tiy were you appointed as opposed to Mr. 
Vanderlinden or Mr. Cda ? 
Attorney Oathcart: 
All three public defenders had a conflict is what 
I was told by Mr. Cella. 
(transcripts pg. 10) 
At the time set for hearing on the certificate of probable 
cause, .Attorney Vanderlinden did not show ?s he refuseo to 
accept the case at bar and Attorney Cella addressee: the trial 
court as follows: 
^t ucr:;ey .^ lic;: 
cuc^e, we ve nau a discussion 06tv.;uc:. ».r« us., 
Mr. Humphries and mvself re~?rdin~ the problems 
appeal. We've explained the problem to Mr. 
Humphries, and he has certain constitutional 
rights that he!s not willing to waive, and we 
aren't asking him to waive any of those rights. 
and he (Attorney Vanderlinden) declined 
to accept the case through the public defenders 
system." 
• . ... And Judge Page requested and said that 
in situations such as that and in the event 
Mr. Vandelinden declined to accept my conflict 
O f int.PT»OQ+ +U~4- J-T- -
(memorandum cont fd) 
known to the Court. " 
Attorney Cella: 
.....So in any event , as I was explaining, Judge 
Fage said in additional situations such as that, 
I should merely inform the Court and the Court to 
order lir. Vanderlinden to take the case, 
(transcripts pg 3 through 6) 
The issue W;JS also dit jusre-: -M Thv hearings •:-. the ;r•: , 
of January, the 31st of January, the 14th of Karch and the 
2~th of L.arch, 1?S9. 
• . _ u. "hries had ? discussion r-s ^11 
Che Court: 
It seems like you have a hard time deciding if he 
is going to represent you cr not. 
lir. Humphries: 
No, sir. The 3ourt has ordered me to proceed with 
v.'itC-. attorney Vand t --lin -«-r:. 
Ho, I haven't. 
-lr. Humphries: 
So much. Cr proceed pro-se. 
iynemoraniua! c o n t ! J ) 
you a n o t n e r r. 
r r e c t . - nav 
At to rney • 
s--j;! I xr: n o t a : : n o i n t i n 
Mr. Humphries: 
1 told the Court, your honor, that I*m not capabl 
of re presenting myself. •..•..• 
(transcripts raaa 6) 
V a a an t i 
. — v^ _k. ; 
• v. - ^ U . j -
i\.r ;::s jetVncr. 
tj^li-reee-rr-^eTesri .Jui.i L, a tea m a 
non :J: 
I'.TLT'J'.TJ ev 
The .a;V tc 
In State V. >'a""ioho" 
;he court stated in Dart: 
*-)
 r. v O p / ^ T' -L . i 
J > 
the right of the accused to have counsel is not satisfied 
(mtrmor^ndu^ contf j) 
attorney vhc manifests no real concern -cout the interests cf 
the accused. He is entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the bar, who shows a willingness to identify himsel: 
vvith the interests of the accused and present such defences 
as are available under the law and consistent with the ethics 
of the profession," 
•urtner^ore a;:ncu 
V U.oi v 
nted c o u n s e l lias r e f u s e d 
n; 
( ? 
111 
.a:- the .'-appellant denied due process oy z 
isiny false convictions (two felonies and i 
:ained in the presentence investiration re:: 
action of both the /.a reliant and his ecu rise 
n names one jour 
>vhere a def cndan tsa ^pointed jounsei inOt^nis to nryu. 
particular colorable points, but defendant requests that he 
raise additional colorable points, counsel must aryue the 
additional points to the full extent of his professional ability, 
uid appointed counsels judgement that defendant is m n v ^ ^ 
(^e^oreniun cont! d } 
to rrevail on the merits of hip nori friviJous ar^,-'^nts i? no 
substitute for an active advocates1 presentation cf those arguemei-t 
to the appellate court. 
Barnes V. Jones, ^.~. h.Y. 1981, 665 ?2d 4"7 
,nhererore the .'.:• r;-el 
appoin tTm--n~ u'lioi; u c ouns! 
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APPENDIX D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F I L E D 
JUL 2 01989 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas R. Humphries, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 880704-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion To 
Appoint New Counsel On Pendency Of Appeal, filed 26 June 1989. 
Appellant is currently represented by counsel who was 
appointed by the Second Judicial District Court. Counsel 
entered an appearance herein on 3 February 1989 and, to date, 
las filed a docketing statement and brief on behalf of 
ippellant. Counsel has responded timely to inquiries made by 
:he Court with respect to this appeal. 
Appellant shows no substantial conflict of interest with 
is attorney. As appellant was appointed competent counsel, 
T IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion is denied. If 
ppellant prefers new counsel, appellant is not precluded from 
iring counsel of his choice. 
Dated this ^ day of July 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
udge Norman H. Jackson 
